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FAITH-BASED CHARITIES AND THE QUEST TO

SOLVE AMERICA'S SOCIAL ILLS: A LEGAL
AND POLICY ANALYSIS
Lewis D. Solomon and Matthew J. Vlissides, Jr.t
INTRODUCTION
In his inaugural address, President George W. Bush proclaimed,
"Church and charity, synagogue and mosque, lend our communities their
humanity and they will have an honored place in our plans and in our
laws." 1 Nine days later, the President signed Executive Order 13,199
establishing a White House "Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives" to "help the Federal Government coordinate a national effort to
expand opportunities for faith-based and other community organizations. ''2 Executive Order 13,198, signed at the same ceremony, estab-

lished a "Center for Faith-Based and Community Initiatives" in the
Departments of Justice, Education, Labor, Health and Human Services,
and Housing and Urban Development. 3 The stated goal is to "eliminate
regulatory, contracting, and other programmatic obstacles to the participation of faith-based and other community organizations in the provision
of social services."4
Based on these executive orders, it appears President Bush intends
to follow through on his campaign pledge to make faith-based organizations (FBOs) an integral provider of government-funded social services.
Confronted with this new reality, what kinds of obstacles are likely to be
encountered?
To begin with, how will the public respond to an overtly religious
social service provider? In a recent work titled The Diminishing Divide:
Religion's Changing Role in American Politics, Andrew Kohut and his
co-authors show that Americans, since the 1960s, have become more tolt Lewis D. Solomon is the Theodore Rinehart Professor of Business Law at The George
Washington University Law School. Matthew J.Vlissides, Jr. is a student at The George
Washington University Law School. We gratefully acknowledge the research assistance of
Todd G.E. Melnick, Reference Librarian, Jacob Bums Law Library, The George Washington
University Law School.
I President: 'IAsk You to Be Citizens,' N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2001, at A14.
2 Exec. Order No. 13,199, 66 Fed. Reg. 8499 (Jan. 29, 2001).
3 Exec. Order No. 13,198, 66 Fed. Reg. 8497 (Jan. 29, 2001).
4 Id.
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erant of "closer links between religion and politics." 5 After examining
polling data from that decade, and comparing it with data collected
throughout the 1990s, the authors conclude that "the days when religion
and politics were never to be discussed in public are long over."'6 And
yet they caution "the secularizing pressures of modern society will present a powerful challenge to the expansion of religious affiliations, prac'7
tices, and beliefs."
The apparent contradiction neatly states the fundamental obstacle to
FBOs: while most Americans accept that religion can have a positive
role in public life, in an increasingly secular society, the prospect of government embracing religion as policy is unnerving. But why? What prevents religion from being an important part of public life in a secular
society? The answer is not as daunting as some have portrayed.
A.

DEEP DIVISIONS, INFLEXIBLE POSITIONS

The distinction made throughout this article is that while it is logical
to assume that secularization affects a religious institution's ability to
gain converts, the institution itself may very well carry on and thrive by
affiliating with secular people and organizations. This distinction often
goes unnoticed because, in recent history, scholars, politicians, and the
public too often focus on the symbolic relationship between church and
state." Rather than view church/state relations as "zero-sum," meaning
that religious involvement in public affairs comes at the expense of civil
society and vice versa, it is better to evaluate the benefits of specific
partnerships. 9
5 ANDREW

KOHUT ET AL., THE DIMINISHING DIVIDE: RELIGION'S CHANGING ROLE IN

AMERICAN POLITICS

123 (2000).

6 Id. at 122.
7 Id. at

128.
See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND
POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 4-5 (1993). Professor Carter provides an apt illustration when he describes a religiously oriented drug treatment program that asks its members
to pray. Id. "The program, then, could fairly be described as proselytizing - but, unlike
some forms of proselytization, its work is in a secular cause." Id.
9 A contrary view, expressed by Professor Esbeck, is that:
8

[I]t should be stated candidly and up front that there is no truly neutral position...
for all models of church/state relations embody substantive choices .... Separation-

ism is a value-laden judgment that certain areas of the human condition best lie
within the province of religion, while other areas of life are properly under the authority of civil government .... The same must be said for its primary competitor,
the neutrality theory. Indeed, to demand that any theory of church/state relations
transcend its pedigree or its presuppositions and be substantively neutral is to ask the
impossible.
Carl H. Esbeck, A ConstitutionalCasefor Governmental Cooperation with Faith-BasedSocial
Service Providers, 46 EMORY L.J. 1, 5 (1997).
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Arguing religion as an important element of public life does not
simultaneously mean an end to the Establishment Clause. 10 Strict
separationists reject this notion because the symbolic meaning of any
partnership between church and state runs contrary to the idea, articulated by Justice Hugo Black, that, "The First Amendment has erected a
wall between church and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach." 1 1
In a similar vein, some advocates of faith-based social assistance
excoriate past federal programs for embracing secularism. They assert
that while government welfare programs in the past "declared a war on
poverty that was actually a war on God, since the Bible was excluded...
from governmental antipoverty work," government must learn from its
failures and embrace a "New Pragmatism ... [where] religious programs
12
receive no special preference but no special antagonism either."
In the end, however, framing the issue of "closer links between religion and politics" in symbolic terms alone creates an unworkable paradox. Without reasoned arguments and empirical data, one cannot answer
the question: Can religion's public role expand in a secular society? This
question needs to be answered because voters and their elected representatives often turn to "religion," albeit a fuzzy concept at times, when addressing an array of social problems. It can hardly be said that a latter
day "Great Awakening" is responsible.
Indeed, it is doubtful that the trend toward "faith-based" solutions is
a product of greater religiosity in recent years. 13 The explanation is more

mundane: despite government efforts, poverty, substance abuse, and
crime remain serious problems and the public blames government for not
"fixing" these problems.
In the wake of dismantling much of the traditional welfare apparatus
in 1996, not surprisingly, the public and politicians of both parties are, in
2001, receptive to new ideas. 14 Concrete expectations and not religious
fervor, therefore, have made FBOs viable public policy.
Evaluating FBOs though the prism of secular versus sacred misses
the point. Public interest in FBOs is not a product of heightened religios10 See Carter, supra note 8, at 105-121.
11 Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947). It is interesting to note that
this often cited case, symbol of the strict separation doctrine, actually condoned the use of state

funds for parochial schools. Id.

12 MARVIN OLASKY, RENEWING AMERICAN COMPASSION 138 (1996).
13 See KOHUT ET AL., supra note 5, at 16-33.
14 See CBS News Poll, July 14, 1999, available at WESTLAW, POLL Database,
USCBS.99007A Q52 010 (showing that sixty-five percent of those surveyed favored federal
grants to FBOs); Family Research Council, America Assesses Drug Policy Survey, July 13,
1998, available at WESTLAW, POLL Database, USPC.98DRUG R13 018 (showing that
sixty-four percent of those surveyed felt that the government should make it easier for FBOs to
expand their drug treatment programs).
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ity, rather it is derivative of the public discrediting of government social
service provision. Indeed, despite the trend toward secularization, the
public is willing to accept some level of religious involvement in heretofore-secular government programs because there is a general belief that
they work. Our task is to confirm or deny this perception while also
examining the potential constitutional and practical impediments to President Bush's proposals. Our analysis offers three conclusions.
First, FBOs are effective at dealing with chronic social problems by
combining material assistance with spiritual uplift, thus sparking personal transformation. The bonds formed by FBOs within communities
facilitate behavior modification "one person at a time." Sectarian differences among FBOs are not major factors in this calculus. FBOs sponsored by various religious denominations achieve similar positive results
in dealing with social problems not otherwise adequately handled by existing public sector programs.
FBOs' success stems from addressing the spiritual needs of individuals by instilling values that change behavior.1 5 This is possible because
their volunteer staffs interact closely with the people they serve.16 Thus,
such organizations hold promise' 7 as a way to help the hard-core under18
class of the inner cities.
Second, financing FBOs through the Tax Code is preferable to direct federal funding. The fear that public funding means government
take-over of religion serves as perhaps the greatest impediment to a more
expansive role for FBOs. For that reason, direct funding of FBOs is
problematic. Better to encourage taxpayers to contribute more by allowing deductions for non-itemizers and to choose which FBOs to fund
through tax credits. Direct funding also suffers from another weakness:
governmental bureaucracy and political patronage.
Third, although predicting the U.S. Supreme Court's resolution of
church-state issues is fraught with difficulties, the emerging "equal treatment" of religion by the High Court supports the constitutionality of publicly funding FBOs. As long as no one denomination is favored and
beneficiaries are given a secular alternative, no constitutional bar exists.
15 144 CONG. REC. S12686 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1998) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft).
16 Amy L. Sherman, Cross Purposes: Will Conservative Welfare Reform CorruptReligious Charities?,POL'Y REV., Fall 1995, at 58, 60.

17 One major caveat to involving FBOs is the FBO itself. The religious character of a
FBO is what makes it uniquely suited to cope with difficult social problems. If government
funding comes at the cost of stifling this message or if the expansion robs FBOs of their
strengths (i.e., personal attention), then FBOs become victims of their own success. Thus

FBOs must be assured an independent role in the eyes of the law and that the cost of participation is not unduly burdensome. In reality, it is too early to tell if FBOs are convinced.
18 David Kuo, Re-Funding Social Services: Why Government Shouldn't Fear Working
With Churches, BLUEPRINT, Spring 1999, at 34, available at http://www.ndol.org/blueprint.
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While the tax alternative seems certain to pass constitutional muster, direct funding is more vulnerable to accusations of government favoritism.
The article is divided into five sections. The first looks at the "welfare state" in the twentieth century, reasons for reform in 1996 (and what
it entailed), and religion's importance to welfare reform. The second
section attempts to define FBOs and the "Charitable Choice" provisions
of the 1996 Welfare Reform Act, and evaluates their success and future.
The third, fourth, and fifth sections assess the hurdles to implementing
church/state collaboration: the third section examines whether greater
collaboration is constitutional; the fourth section asks whether religion
and by extension FBOs are effective at dealing with social problems; and
the fifth section evaluates President Bush's plan and its alternatives.
I.
A.

THE FOUNDATION FOR WELFARE REFORM

WELFARE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Throughout American history, towns, counties, and states made efforts to address poverty. But only the twentieth century witnessed the
creation of expansive federal welfare programs.1 9 Make no mistake,
welfare existed in America before the 1936 Social Security Act and was
a subject of great debate.2 0 However, the New Deal and Great Society
marked the zenith of the American welfare state. 2' During this time,
Americans accepted government's moral obligation to provide temporary
assistance to its less fortunate citizens. 22 This burden on government the price of "social justice"- became a routine budget item under presidents of both parties. 2 3 But with time, moral obligation evolved into
something new. Housing, child support, and unemployment assistance,
no longer temporary assistance, became the frontline for an expansive
interpretation of government's moral cum legal obligation: one that
24
stressed entitlement.
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Emergency
Assistance (EA), both open-ended entitlements, were the two pillars of
19 William P. Quigley, Reluctant Charity: Poor Laws in the Original Thirteen States, 31
U. RICH. L. REv. 111, 116-19 (1997).
20 See generally MICHAEL B. YTZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL
HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA (1996); WALTER I. TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE: A HISTORY OF SOCIAL WELFARE IN AMERICA (6th ed. 1999); Joan Underhill
Hannon, The Generosity of Antebellum Poor Relief, 44 J. EcON. HIST. 810 (1984); William P.

Quigley, Work or Starve: Regulation of the Poor in. Colonial America, 31 U.S.F. L. Rev. 35
(1996).
21 See generally supra note 20.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
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"traditional" welfare.2 5 AFDC "enabl[ed] each State to furnish financial
assistance and rehabilitation and other services, as practicable under the
conditions in such State, to needy dependent children, ' 26 with the federal
government reimbursing states, after 1965, at a minimum of 50 percent
and a maximum of 83 percent, depending on the given state's per capita
income. 2 7 Moreover, the entitlement remained intact notwithstanding
28
budget deficits and recessions.
AFDC supported needy children who were deprived of parental
support or care because their father or mother was incapacitated, deceased, or unemployed, or continuously absent from home.2 9 It also permitted payments for the child's needy caretaker relative (usually the
mother), for another person in the home deemed essential to the child's
well-being, and for pregnant women in their third trimester of pregnancy. 30 EA provided short-term emergency services and benefits to
needy families. 31 The Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training Program (JOBS) program, however, unlike the other two, was a capped entitlement (at $1 billion in 1996)32 designed to "assure that needy families
with children obtain[ed] the education, training, and employment that
w[ould] help them avoid long-term welfare dependence." 33 Essentially,
welfare policy before the 1996 reforms focused on supplying the material
needs of its recipients. Although the JOBS program's stated goal was to
35
prevent long-term dependency, 34 its exemptions permitted dependency.
Obligation and entitlement are often considered parallels, however,
sense of entitlement arose decades after the New Deal proclaimed the
government's moral obligation. 36 The move to "empower" poor Ameri25 STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 105'"CONG., 1998 GREEN BOOK 398

(Comm. Print 1998).
26 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1994) (repealed 1996).
27 STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, supra note 25, at 405 (noting the
matching formula came into existence with the creation of Medicaid). See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396d(b) (1998).
28 R. KENT WEAVER, ENDING WELFARE AS WE KNow IT 16-17 (2000).
29 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1994) (repealed 1996).
30 42 U.S.C. § 606(b) (1994) (repealed 1996).
31 42 U.S.C. § 606(e)(1) (1994) (repealed 1996).
32 STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, supra note 25, at 475-76.
33 42 U.S.C. § 681 (1994) (repealed 1996).
34 See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, supra note 25, at 489-90 (noting
AFDC and EA contained no time limits, and no performance bonuses existed for states that
encouraged recipients to seek jobs); see also 42 U.S.C. § 682(d) (1994) (repealed 1996) (requiring that recipients of ancillary programs, such as JOBS, pursue educational opportunities
or jobs skills training).
35 See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19)(C) (1994) (repealed 1996) (exempting people who were
"ill, incapacitated or of advanced age[,] ... needed in the home because of the illness or
incapacity of another member of the household[, or] ... the parent or other relative of a child
under 3 years of age").
36 See generally supra note 20.
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cans in the 1960s ensured that the cost of entitlements would never extinguish government's obligation. 37 Cost was irrelevant in the moral
calculus of social justice. For many politicians "social justice" meant an
entitlement program. Politicians accepted the cost of entitlement programs without necessarily identifying with the priorities of social justice,
making the institutional momentum behind the "welfare state" politically
38
difficult to reform if it meant a reduction in benefits.
That is, until 1996. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 199639 (hereinafter referred to as the "Welfare Reform Act," or the "Act") was an unprecedented departure from
political orthodoxy. It emerged after Republicans took control of the
House of Representatives and during the administration of the first "New
Democrat" president. Upon signing the Welfare Reform Act into law,
the President called for "all of us - States and cities, the Federal Government, businesses and ordinary citizens. - to work together to make
the promise of this new day real."' 40 This message contrasted sharply
with President Franklin D. Roosevelt's observation that, "[w]here heretofore men had turned to neighbors for help and advice, they now turned to
41
Government.,
The Welfare Reform Act reorganized federal contributions, creating
one capped entitlement to the states known as Temporary Assistance to
Needy Families (TANF). The TANF block grants provided states with a
fixed annual amount based on past expenditures for AFDC benefits and
administration, EA, and JOBS. 42 The grants would equal the greater of:
(1) the average federal payments for these programs from 1993 to 1994;
(2) federal payments in 1994, plus additional EA funding for some states;

37

Id.

38

Id.

39 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 104193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
40 Statement on Signing the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 32 WEEKLY. COMP. PRES. Doc. 1487, 1489 (Aug. 22, 1996). President
Clinton prefaced this by saying:

[T]his bill is a real step forward for our country, for our values, and for people on
welfare. It should represent not simply the ending of a system that too often hurts
those it is supposed to help, but the beginning of a new era in which welfare will

become what it was meant to be: a second chance, not a way of life.
Id.
41 Franklin D. Roosevelt, "A Social Security ProgramMust Include All Those Who Need
Its Protection." Radio Address on the Third Anniversary of the Social Security Act. White
House, Washington, D.C., Aug. 15, 1938, in THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE FOR LIBERALISM 478 (Samuel I. Rosenman

ed., 1941).
42 STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS,

supra note 25, at 503.
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or (3) estimated federal payments in 1995. 43 The Act also gave states

44
access to a $2 billion contingency fund.
Beyond changing the federal-state spending mechanism, the Act
45
conditioned assistance on a set of state-devised objective criteria.
There were no longer guaranteed benefits, 46 meaning no entitlement. If
eligible for assistance, a recipient lost eligibility after two cumulative
years. 47 The state criteria also required recipients to work after two years
of assistance. 48 Single-parent recipients are required to work 20 hours
per week, increasing to 30 by 2000, and two-parent families are required
to work 35 hours per week. 49 There are exemptions to the work rule for
single parents with children under age six who cannot find child-care. 50
Under the Act, states must have work participation rates of 25% in
1997 increasing to 50% in 2002. 5 1 The two-parent family rate increases
from 75% to 95% by 1999.52 Substantive penalties and rewards encourage states to meet the work participation guidelines, an aspect absent
in the superannuated AFDC and EA programs.5 3 With TANF, a wide
array of penalties are available including a 5% loss in a state's block
grant if it fails to meet the work participation rate. 54 The penalty increases by 2% for each consecutive failure with a maximum reduction of

21%.

55

A state performing well based on a formula developed by the

Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) may receive a bonus
not to exceed 5% of the state's block grant.5 6 The five states that demon-

strate the greatest reduction in out-of-wedlock births and abortions qual57
ify for additional bonuses of up to $20 million.
The policies behind TANF, to reduce dependency by limiting benefits, providing states with incentives to reduce welfare loads, and making
job programs mandatory, contrast sharply with the pre-1996 focus on
material support. At their core, the "tough" measures included in TANF
43 Id.

44 42 U.S.C. § 603(b) (1998).
45 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1998).
46 42 U.S.C. § 601(b) (1998).
47 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(l)(A)(ii) (1998).
48 Id.
49 42 U.S.C. § 607(d) (1998) (defining work as including unsubsidized and subsidized
employment, on-the-job-training, work experience, community service, up to 12 months of
vocational training, or provision of childcare services to individuals who are participating in
community service).

50 42 U.S.C.
51 42 U.S.C.
52 42 U.S.C.
53 42 U.S.C.
54 42 U.S.C.
55 42 U.S.C.
56 42 U.S.C.
57 42 U.S.C.

§ 607(e)(2) (1998).
§ 607(a)(1) (1998).
§ 607(a)(2) (1998).
§ 609 (1998).
§ 609(a)(1)(B) (1998).
§ 609(a)(3)(B) (1998).
§ 603(a)(4)(B)(ii) (1998).
§ 603(a)(2)(B)(i)(1) (1998).
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were intended to alter behavior. The confluence of events - both a
Congress and President willing to radically change the welfare - was
not, however, coincidental. Rather, it was a reflection of the public's
disappointment with the status quo.
B.

REASONS FOR REFORM

If welfare reform were simply about cost and reducing the federal
budget deficit, there would have been little to debate. If the government
no longer possesses the resources, the question of whether welfare
should continue is academic. Welfare, however, was a budget priority,
and specific entitlement programs like AFDC guaranteed benefits even
in recessions and fiscal downturns. 58 Moreover, federal spending on
AFDC never surpassed one-half of one percent of GDP and, indeed, fell
to only one-fourth of one percent by 1996. 59 Therefore, the impetus behind welfare reform was not the need to cut costs but the palpable sense
that the system was not working. The promise of the twentieth century,
the confidence in social science and its ability to end poverty, much like
the promise of transforming institutions in the nineteenth century, had
not been realized. This sense precipitated the Welfare Reform Act.
Programs such as AFDC and EA successfully raised living standards in terms of providing for the material needs of those in poverty:
cash, food, housing, and education aid. Welfare programs, in large part,
remained true to President Roosevelt's vision of providing Americans
with "that minimum necessary to keep a foothold."'60 Nevertheless, by
1968, the celebrations surrounding the 3 3rd anniversary of the Social Security Act lauding the social insurance provisions did not praise its welfare components. 61 President Johnson put it succinctly when he stated
that: "The welfare system today pleases no one. It is criticized by liberals
and conservatives, by the poor and the wealthy, by social workers and
'62
politicians, by whites and by Negroes in every area of the Nation."
Ultimately, a chasm emerged between the provision of material assistance to the poor, something the government did relatively well, and
the perception of welfare itself. This did not surprise those who viewed
58 See generally STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, supra note 25, at

399-472.
59 C. Eugene Steuerle & Gordon Mermin, Devolution as Seen from the Budget, in AsSESSING NEW FEDERALISM: ISSUES AND OPnONS FOR STATES, (Urban Inst. ed., 1997), availa-

ble at http://newfederalism.urban.org/html/anf~a2.htm#authors.
60 Roosevelt, supra note 41, at 480.
61 US. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, SOCIAL SECURITY ANNIVERSARY 1968: A THIRD OF A CENTURY (1968), available at http://www.ssa.gov/history/

68booklet.html.
62 Statement by the President Upon Signing the Social Security Amendments and Upon
Appointing a Commission to Study the Nation's Welfare Programs January 2, 1968, I PUB.
PAPERS 14 (1970).
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public assistance as "material, [and] that it s[ought] material ends by material means and therefore must fail ...For man is a spiritual being, and
if he is to be helped, it must be by spiritual means. '6 3 Welfare critics and
non-critics alike were confronted with a basic question: Is welfare a
means to an end -- "a second chance" - or an end in itself?
C.

Is

RELIGION THE MISSING COMPONENT?

For Harvard sociologist Robert Putnam, the decline of civic organizations and social interaction is not empirically linked to the welfare
state. 64 But interestingly he notes a loss of what he calls "social capital"
in spite of consistent economic growth throughout the latter half of the
twentieth century. 65 Could this mean that material assistance, alone, is
insufficient for those on welfare? If not, what more is required?
Putnam demonstrates empirically that: (1) social capital is vital to
the overall health of communities; (2) social capital, as expressed by
levels of participation in civic groups, has declined since the 1960s; and
(3) no one factor is to blame. 66 He divides responsibility among "generational changes," meaning an inexorable trend toward less civically
minded generations, pressures of "time and money," electronic and isolating forms of entertainment, above all television, and suburbanization. 67 Putnam concedes, however, that "certain social expenditures and
tax policies may have created disincentives for civic-minded
68
philanthropy."
Although approaching the issue from two different angles, Putnam
and University of Texas journalism professor Marvin Olasky believe
government was not the cause of social disintegration. The principal
concern is that civic involvement generally, for Putnam, and religious
participation in welfare relief efforts, for Olasky, declined throughout the
twentieth century. Putnam ascribes this to socio-economic factors
whereas Olasky criticizes the strict separation that evolved out of twentieth century welfare policy.
Olasky's analysis of twentieth century welfare focuses on two fundamental errors: (1) the government's focus on material aid to the exclusion of moral instruction and (2) the government's unwillingness to use
religion. 69 The first criticism is reminiscent of nineteenth century theo63 TRATrNER, supra
64 ROBERT

D.

note 20,

at 96.

PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN

COMMUNITY 281-82 (2000).
65 Id. at 25.
66 See generally id.
67 Id. at 277-84.
68 Id. at 281.
69 See generally MARVIN

OLASKY, COMPASSIONATE CONSERVATISM: WHAT IT Is, WHAT

IT DOES, AND How IT CAN TRANSFORM AMERICA

(2000).
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des of charity predicated on moral teaching, while the second attacks
strict separation of church and state. Religion played a major role in
nineteenth century welfare whereas the federal government never utilized
religion similarly. Olasky, who is largely responsible for President
Bush's "compassionate conservatism" mantra, argues that "[i]nstead of
either shunning all government contact or engaging in a tight embrace,
they now can try an arms-length handshake," thus at least recognizing
70
the potential synergies between religion and government.
Prior to 1996, there were three possible solutions to the welfare impasse: (1) do nothing, or take only incremental steps at reform; (2) eliminate all government sponsorship of welfare or (3) introduce
comprehensive reforms. The first two options were never really options
because a discredited system needed a new focus, recognizing the indispensable role of government. Nevertheless, in taking the third option,
welfare reform in 1996 need not have incorporated religion. And yet, the
attempted incorporation of FBOs has arguably developed into its most
controversial and promising facet.
II.
A.

WHAT ARE

FBOS AND CHARITABLE CHOICE: A
COMPLEX MARRIAGE?
FBOs AND

WHAT

Do

THEY

Do?

A FBO can be many things; it can be linked with Catholic, Protestant, or Jewish congregations; it may be found in the inner city or the
suburbs; it often has a distinct ethnic identity; and it provides a wide
array of social services that include, but are not limited to, housing, economic development assistance, teen recreational programs, neighborhood
alliances, and soup kitchens. 71 Although the nature of FBOs - typically
small, fragmented, and local - makes a full listing of their activities
impossible, we provide a general impression of their main
characteristics.
70 Id. at 186.
71 See generally RAM
PARTNERSHIP

A. CNAAN, THE NEWER DEAL: SOCIAL WORK AND RELIGION IN
(1999) [hereinafter CNAAN, THE NEWER DEAL]; VIRGINIA A. HODGKINSON &

MURRAY S. WEITZMAN, INDEPENDENT SECTOR, FROM BELIEF TO COMMITMENT: THE COMMU-

NITY SERVICE ACTIVITIES AND FINANCES OF RELIGIOUS CONGREGATIONS IN THE UNITED

STATES (1993); Mark Chaves, Religious Congregationsand Welfare Reform: Who Will Take
Advantage of "Charitable Choice"?, 64 AM. Soc. REV. 836 (1999); Ram A. Cnaan, Keeping
Faith in the City: How 401 Urban Religious CongregationsServe Their Neediest Neighbors,
2000-1 U. PA. CENTER FOR RES. ON RELIGION AND URB. CIV. SoC'Y I [hereinafter Cnaan,
Keeping Faith in the City]; Ram A. Cnaan, Our Hidden Safety Net: Social and Community
Work by Urban American Religious Congregations, BROOKINGS REV., Spring 1999, at 50
[hereinafter Cnaan, Our Hidden Safety Net]; Ram A. Cnaan, Social and Community Involvement of Religious CongregationsHoused in Historic Religious Properties: Findingsfrom a

Six-City Study (May 1998) (unpublished report to Partners for Sacred Places, on file with
authors) [hereinafter Cnaan, Six-City Study].
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One cannot appreciate the diverse make-up of FBOs without examining empirical studies. Multi-city surveys of FBO activities generate a
number of interesting findings: (1) the majority of congregations provide
at least a single type of social service; (2) the types of social services
FBOs offer are extremely varied, though most congregations provide
some core programs; and (3) FBO program offerings are not necessarily
a function of a congregation's racial composition or denomination.
Research indicates that a majority of religious congregations in this
country qualify as FBOs; that is, they provide at least one type of social
service. Naturally, the percentage of congregations that provide at least
one type of social service cannot be determined with precision, but consensus is well over 50 percent. 72 Current research suggests that the correct figure is somewhere around 90 percent. In a 1998 study of Ill
congregations in six metropolitan areas ("Six-City" study), 92.8 percent
of those surveyed provided at least one service. 73 In another national
survey, first conducted in 1987 and then updated in 1993, 92 percent of
74
727 congregations reported offering at least one social service.
Regional studies produce similar results. A 2000 study of 401 Philadelphia congregations found 91 percent sponsored at least one program, 75 while a 1996 study of 196 congregations in Philadelphia placed
the figure at 87 percent. 76 A study conducted in 1997 of 266 religious
congregations in Washington, D.C., and its surrounding suburbs, reported almost 95 percent providing at least one social service; 77 a 1991
study of 152 congregations in Chicago found 77 percent offering at least
78
one program.
The absolute number and types of social services provided by congregations is far greater than what the one-to-one ratio (congregations to
social programs), assumed above, suggests. On average, research indicates congregations are more likely involved in more than one social
service program. The Six-City study placed the figure at over four pro72 See Chaves, supra note 71. The figure may be considerably higher if one excludes the
much-criticized 57 percent found by Chaves. Id. at 838. See, e.g., CNAAN, THE NEWER DEAL;
HODGK1NSON & WEITZMAN, supra note 71; Cnaan, Keeping Faith in the City, supra note 71;
Cnaan, Our Hidden Safety Net, supra note 71; Cnaan, Six-City Study, supra note 71.
73 Cnaan, Six-City Study, supra note 71, at 10.
74 HODGKINSON & WEITZMAN, supra note 71, at 1, 19. As a national sample, this study
was weighted to reflect the current trends of the nations 258,000 religious congregations. Id.
at 6.
75 Cnaan, Keeping Faith in the City, supra note 71, at 4.
76 Cnaan, Six-City Study, supra note 71, at 3.
77 Tobi Jennifer Printz, Faith-BasedService Providersin the Nation's Capital: Can They
Do More?, in CHARTING CIVIL SOCIETY (Urban Inst. ed., 1998), available at http://
www.urban.org/periodcl/cnp/cnp-2.htm.
78 Cnaan, Six-City Study, supra note 71, at 3.
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grams per congregation, 79 and the survey of 401 Philadelphia congregations reported 2.5 programs per congregation. 80
In terms of breadth, the Six-City study determined that 49 social
programs were offered by more than 25 percent of the congregations
surveyed. 8 1 These programs varied greatly in terms of targeted beneficiaries. The most frequently offered programs included: food pantries
(60.36%), music performances (56.76%), clothing (53.15%), holiday
celebrations (53.15%), community fairs (51.35%), choral groups
(51.35%), international relief (51.35%), recreational programs for teens
(45.95%), alliance with neighborhood associations (45.04%), hospital
visitation (44.01%), visitation of sick (43.24%), recreational programs
for children (42.44%), soup kitchen (41.44%), and tutoring (40.54%).82
In addition, congregations offered unique programs not widely reproduced. Congregations in particular cities were more likely to offer certain programs than those in other cities. 83 Thus, regional differences
have an impact on at least some of the programs offered by
congregations.
Race and denomination does not impact on program offerings when
regional differences are accounted for. Race is of particular interest because religious congregations are highly segregated. 84 However, FBOs
derived from mostly African-American or Caucasian congregations provide essentially the same kinds of social services.
Although FBOs are not easily defined, both in terms of the services
offered and their internal organization, no one model has shown itself to
be superior or inferior to another. One may therefore argue that FBOs
are still in an early stage of development and presently resistant to assessment. Nevertheless, in our minds, the correct conclusion, is that
FBOs will never be defined in terms of budgets and bureaucracy. Each
FBO is a black box even though, broadly stated, each FBO's mission is
to help people.
B.

CHARITABLE CHOICE TO THE RESCUE?

The Welfare Reform Act includes a provision that has come to be
known as "Charitable Choice." Charitable Choice has three goals. First,
79 Id. at

31.

80 Cnaan, Keeping Faith in the City, supra note 7 1, at 4. Both the Six-City study and the
401 Philadelphia study may under-represent the true total because both limited each congrega-

tion's response
81 Cnaan,
prepared list of
divided by 449

to only five programs, see Cnaan, Six-City Study, supra note 71, at 12.
Six-City Study, supra note 71, at 13. The 49 programs were chosen from a
200 as part of the survey, id. at 11, so as a percentage it is 49/200 and not 49
(the total number of programs).

82 Id. at 13.
83 Id. at 13-15.
84 Cnaan, Keeping Faith in the City, supra note 71, at 14.
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it encourages states to expand the involvement of community and faithbased organizations in public anti-poverty efforts. Second, the provision
protects the religious integrity and character of faith-based organizations
that choose to accept government funds for social services. And third, it
protects the religious freedom of beneficiaries. The Welfare Reform Act
enforces Charitable Choice's goals in four ways.
First, the federal government and states receiving federal funds cannot discriminate against a private-sector social service provider "on the
basis that the organization has a religious character. '85 Second, "control
over the definition, development, practice of its [the FBO's] religious
beliefs" 86 cannot be impaired. Third, FBOs cannot discriminate against a
beneficiary "on the basis of religion, a religious belief, or refusal to actively participate in a religious practice. '87 And fourth, a beneficiary
who objects to dealing with FBOs is entitled to "an alternative provider
that is accessible to the individual. 8 8
89
The Charitable Choice provision applies to the TANF program.
Included activities are providing work for recipients, food assistance,
maternity homes for unmarried minors and expectant mothers who cannot remain at home, and substance abuse treatment programs. The government funds these services either by paying providers to deliver
specific services or by providing beneficiaries with certificates or vouchers that are redeemable at the FBO or the secular provider of their choice.
These provisions also apply to state funds that commingle with federal
block grant money and, preempt any conflicting state laws.
Aside from guidelines established by legislation, FBOs have developed their own guidelines to reinforce federal regulations that are broken.90 The Code also allays concerns of a state take-over of religion by
the federal funding of FBOs. These guidelines require that participating
FBOs comply with federal regulations; remain truthful and transparent to
the public; protect their autonomy and religious character; do not discriminate or coerce recipients; participate in federal programs only so far
as it is part of the FBO's mission; and remain fiscally prudent and
accountable. 9'
85 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 104-

193, § 104, 110 Stat. 2105, 2162 (1996).
86

Id.

87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.

at 2163.
at 2113.

90 See generally A Code of Conduct, 117 THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY, July 5, 2000, availa-

ble at 2000 WL 9857739.
91 Id. at 718 ("Signatories to the Code agree to faithfully abide by the regulations of
Charitable Choice[,] . . . openly agree that government legitimately asserts certain requirements, and that having agreed to accept funds, the organizations accept the duties attached
(unless a gross injustice or issue of conscience would compel dissent).").
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The question remains whether FBOs are taking advantage of the
federal government's new stance, embodied in the Charitable Choice
provisions, toward non-secular social service providers. Objections to
Charitable Choice are not limited to advocates of strict separation of
church and state. Criticism comes from those who argue Charitable
Choice is "creat[ing] a spiritual poverty trap for religious charities by
attracting them with government dollars and then forcing them, through a
web of regulations and ambiguities, to forfeit time, resources, and ulti92
mately mission."
Many FBOs may be reluctant to accept federal funding if conditioned on government certification. Although Charitable Choice integrates FBOs into the general pool of independent social service providers
and expressly protects the integrity of religious organizations, past experience shows that the promise of federal funding can have a "corrupting"
influence. 93 Anecdotal evidence shows that over time, long periods in
many cases, the religious zeal of a small, independent ministry is lost
once federal dollars begin to pour in. Catholic Charities (begun in 1910)
and Volunteers of America (begun in 1896) once focused on providing
social services and, in the latter's case, openly proselytized its beneficiaries. 94 Both organizations now receive considerable federal support,
64% of total revenues for Catholic Charities and 69% of total revenues
for Volunteers of America. 95 Both organizations are now headquartered
96
in Washington D.C. and have embraced policy advocacy.
The story of REACH, Inc., the community development arm of the
12 th Street Missionary Baptist Church in Detroit, sums up the suspicions
harbored by FBOs. The organization started senior outreach programs,
ran day-care centers, and rehabilitated old properties. 97 REACH operations depended on charitable donations from parishioners and private
companies, but in the early 1990s it received a grant from the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). 9 8 Bureaucratic tangles arrived with expanding operations through federal money,
ultimately slowing work, and a sense of creeping "impersonalization." 99
REACH became less informal, less reliant on volunteers, and relied more
92 Lisa E. Oliphant, Charitable Choice: The End of Churches As We Know Them?, 58
POL'Y & PRAC. OF PUB. HUM. SERVICES, June 1, 2000, at 1, available at 2000 WL 18991172.
93 Terrence Scanlon, Letter to the Editor, Beware the Effects of Government Funds on
Charities, THE CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, September 9, 1999, at 42, available at LEXIS,
News Library, U.S. News, Combined File.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Sherman, Cross Purposes, supra note 16, at 59-60.
98 Id.
99 Id.
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on professionals to staff their programs. 100 As budgets rose from $1 million annually before the HUD grant to $1.7 million to fund a single housing project, ministry programs focused less on "moral and spiritual
matters" and more on a "commodified" version of their earlier activities. 01 Thus objective criteria and statistics replaced the informality of
10 2
human development.
Although Charitable Choice has not existed for very long, prelimi10 3
nary research suggests that FBOs have not rushed to take advantage.
An analysis of data collected in the 1998 National Congregations Study
(NCS) indicates only three percent of congregations with social service
projects receive government funds. In the Washington, D.C. area, in
1997, 11 out of 266 congregations received government funds and what
l
was received amounted to less than five percent of their total budget.' 4
It is possible the statistical findings to date are a product of the number and size of most FBOs. FBOs are typically small, church affiliated
organizations, found in virtually every American city, staffed almost entirely by volunteers. Thus, they are not ideally organized (viz., centrally
run by lawyers) to take immediate advantage of an obscure provision of
the Welfare Reform Act.
There are, however, three reasons why FBOs have not taken advantage of government assistance: (1) states have been slow to comply with
the federal mandate allowing "pervasively" sectarian groups to bid on
social service contracts; (2) FBOs are simply not aware of the changes in
federal law and presumably would participate if informed; and (3) FBOs
are aware of Charitable Choice but are reluctant to participate.
First, removing state barriers against FBOs is a prerequisite to the
full implementation of Charitable Choice because, as was the case before
passage of the Welfare Reform Act, states ultimately implement federal
welfare mandates. Clearly, ensuring states are in compliance with Charitable Choice is not trivial nor is there a simple way of gauging compliance. The Center for Public Justice examined nine states and rated
Charitable Choice compliance by assigning grades of satisfactory, insufficient, or unsatisfactory. 10 5 Only two states, Texas and Wisconsin, re100 Id.
101
102
103
104
105

Id.
Id.
Printz, supra note 77, at 2.
Id.
THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC JUSTICE, CHARITABLE CHOICE COMPLIANCE: A NATIONAL

REPORT CARD, (Oct. 5, 2000), available at http://downloads.weblogger.com/gems/cpj/

50StateRpt.pdf. States receiving Fs fall short on compliance with Charitable Choice .... To
be compliant, states have to go beyond their past practice of contracting with religiously affiliated providers to obtain secular services ....

To be compliant, states must follow the new

rules when they use federal money to buy services ... [and] must evaluate their procurement
policies and practices and change those that conflict with Charitable Choice. Id.
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ceived satisfactory marks. 10 6 Four states (California, Illinois, Michigan,
and Virginia) received insufficient marks. 10 7 And three states (Massachusetts, Mississippi, and New York) each received marks indicating that
their compliance efforts were unsatisfactory. 10 8 In a subsequent study of
all 50 states, only 12 states were given a passing grade with just four
states receiving an "A." 10 9
Compliance with Charitable Choice parallels the number of new
collaborations between FBOs and states. This preliminary conclusion
draws support from a companion study to the nine state survey. This
research indicated the two satisfactory states had a total of 61 new collaborations since 1996; the four insufficient states had 53 new collaborations; and the three unsatisfactory states had 13 new collaborations." 0
Second, the 1998 NCS study found only 24% of the nearly 1200
congregations studied were aware of the Charitable Choice provisions of
the Welfare Reform Act.' 1 ' Even so, the long-term significance of this
poor name recognition is questionable; with time, most FBOs can be
expected to develop a basic understanding of what Charitable Choice has
to offer. There is little reason to believe that the current ignorance of
Charitable Choice constitutes a structural impediment to its future
expansion.
The final explanation for the restrained response of FBOs to Charitable Choice presents the gravest problem for the new emphasis on sectarian social service providers. Ultimately, FBOs need to feel comfortable
when accepting government funds or else the suspicions of government
may compel FBOs to remain autonomous. The 1998 NCS study found
15% of the congregations studied had standing policies against accepting
government funds and 36% would apply for government funds if
possible.

106 Id.
107

Id.

108 Id.
109 Id.

110

See AMY L. SHERMAN, 2000 CHARITABLE CHOICE TRACKING PROJECT, THE GROWING

IMPACT OF CHARITABLE CHOICE: A CATALOGUE OF NEW COLLABORATIONS BETWEEN GOVERN-

(2000).
SI11
Chaves, Religious Congregationsand Welfare Reform, supra note 71, at 839. Similar
research conducted in Philadelphia found that only 8.2 percent of the congregations surveyed,
as of February 2000, are familiar with Charitable Choice. Cnaan, Keeping Faith in the City,
supra note 71, at 19. Two and a half percent reported holding discussions about taking advantage of federal funds, but only one congregation had received a government contract under
Charitable Choice. Id. at 19-20. However, 62.1 percent answered yes when asked: "If not
actively involved with Charitable Choice, would your congregation consider applying for government funds under the provisions of Charitable Choice?" Id. at 20.
MENT AND FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS IN NINE STATES
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EXPANSION OF CHARITABLE CHOICE

Despite the tepid response to the 1996 Welfare Reform Act's Charitable Choice provisions, Congress has embraced the concept in recently
proposed and enacted legislation. In four separate legislative initiatives,
the formula employed in 1996 was used again to make FBOs eligible
partners in a vast array of federal programs.
The Coats Human Services Reauthorization Act of 1998 incorporated Charitable Choice in the Community Services Block Grant Program, which "provide[s] assistance to States and local communities,
working through a network of community action agencies and other
neighborhood-based organizations, for the reduction of poverty." 112 As a
result of the Children's Health Act of 2000,113 Charitable Choice now
also covers federal money used to operate drug and alcohol treatment
programs.1 4 More ambitiously, the proposed Charitable Choice Expansion Act of 1999 sought to make Charitable Choice a part of all federal
spending programs "in which the Federal, State, or local government is
authorized to use nongovernmental organizations, through contracts,
1
grants, certificates, vouchers, or other forms of disbursement."' '5
III.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FUNDING FBOS

Courts interpret the First Amendment's Establishment Clause to
prohibit governmental action that "promotes" religion. 1 6 Two competing approaches exist for resolving controversies dealing with whether or
not governmental action promotes religion. The traditional separation
theory disfavors any government involvement in religion, raising Constitutional issues with respect to any governmental funding scheme, including Charitable Choice. Under the equal treatment, or "nonpreferential"
view, a neutral government aid program in which religious groups participate would unlikely offend the Establishment Clause. Furthermore,
enhanced tax incentives to charitable giving do not run counter to either
theory.

112 Coats Human Services Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 105-285, § 672, 112 Stat.

2702, 2728 (1998).
113 Children's Health Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-310, 114 Stat. 1101 (2000).
114 Id.

1'5 S. 1113, 106" Cong. § 1994A(c) (1999).
116 Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 846-47 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,

concurring) ("Public funds may not be used to endorse the religious message." (quoting
Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 642 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting))).
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SEPARATION THEORY AND ITS EXCEPTIONS

Everson v. Board -of Education established the basic principles underlying separation. 11 7 The U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the establishment of religion to include laws that "aid one religion, aid all
religions, or prefer one religion over another."1 8 Justice Hugo Black's
majority opinion stated "[n]o tax in any amount, large or small, can be
levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they
may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice
religion."1 9 Under this view, commentators characterize the Establishment Clause as erecting a "wall of separation" between Church and
State. 120 The public sector could not fund any organization religious in
character. However, if it could separate its secular and sacred elements,
the government could fund the secular part. The broad separation theory
of Everson remained the dominant view of the High Court until the late
1980s. Although confusing to apply, the Court has never officially abandoned separation and therefore it remains relevant for FBOs receiving
1 21
direct government assistance.
It is worth noting, although Everson is often cited for its exposition
of the separationism theory, the Court's opinion upheld the challenged
state law authorizing local school boards to reimburse parents for the
costs of transporting their children enrolled in parochial schools.' 22 The
Court found no Establishment Clause violation because government
funds were provided under a general nondiscriminatory program, available to parents of children in both public and parochial schools. 123 The
Court distinguished between financial assistance benefiting a religious
institution, thereby aiding religion, and financial assistance for programs
such as transportation that are "marked off from the religious function." 124 The Court regarded the latter type of assistance as more like
general public services such as police and fire protection, that do not
25
constitute support of the institution's religious mission.'

Subsequently, in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 126 the Court, in striking down
state laws providing salary supplements to teachers of secular subjects in
faith-based schools, introduced a three-part test to determine whether a
challenged government action is sufficiently separate from the organiza117 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,15-16, 18 (1947).
118 Id. at 15.
119 Id. at 16.
120 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165 (1878).
121 LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

122 330 U.S. at 4.
123 Id. at 25.
124 Id. at 18.
125 Id. at 17.

126 403 U.S. 602 (1971).

150 (1994).
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tion's religious function. 127 To satisfy this test, the statute in question (1)
must have a secular legislative purpose; (2) its principal or primary effect
must neither advance nor inhibit religion; and (3) it must not foster "an
excessive government entanglement with religion."' 128 The Lemon test,
by barring programs that advance religion or even significantly involve
the government with religious institutions, made separation the guiding
129
force in church-state cases.
Aguilar v. Felton130 illustrates the evolving approach to the Establishment Clause in the context of elementary schools, in which the Court
tends to apply separationism most strictly. The case involved a federal
program under which public teachers taught reading and math classes in
parochial schools. 13 1 Under the program, teachers were directed to avoid
involvement with religious activities and prohibited from using religious
materials. 132 Rooms were cleared of religious symbols and teachers
were supervised by a system of unannounced visits. 1 33 In an opinion by

Justice Brennan, the Court held the program unconstitutional for two reasons. First, because aid was provided in a "pervasively sectarian environment," 134 the monitoring system necessary to avoid the program
being used to inculcate religious beliefs excessively entangled the state
with religion.135 Second, the program subsidized religion directly by relieving the schools of paying for remedial classes. 136 The Court issued a
similar opinion in the companion case of GrandRapids School Districtv.
Ball.137
In Agostini v. Felton,138 the Court reversed itself and upheld the
139
federally funded remedial education program struck down in Aguilar.
The Court reaffirmed its test whether aiding government programs had a
secular purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion. 140 However, intervening cases undermined the basis for the
conclusion in Aguilar for two reasons. First, the Court has abandoned
127 Id. at

612-13.

128 Id.

129 Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 230, 236
(1994).
130 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
131 Id. at 406.
132 Id. at 407.
133 Id. at 406-07.
134 Id. at 412.
135 Id. at 412-13.

136 Id. at 417 (Powell, J., concurring).
137 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (holding publicly funded remedial non-religious courses taught
by state employees at parochial schools have primary effect of advancing religion due to the
risk of state sponsored religious indoctrination).
138 521 U.S, 203 (1997).
139 Id. at 234-35.
140 Id.
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the presumption that public employees placed on parochial school
grounds will inevitably inculcate religion or represent a symbolic union
between government and religion.14' And second, the Court no longer
presumes that all government funds directly aiding the educational function of religious schools are invalid. 4 2 A crucial element in analyzing
programs aiding students in religious schools is whether candidates are
selected on a religiously neutral basis. 143 Agostini signals a less restrictive application of separationism and a greater recognition that a secular
purpose can exist in a religious environment.
In Romer v. Maryland Public Works Board,144 the Court upheld discretionary grants to qualifying private colleges, including religious colleges, provided the funds not be used for "sectarian purposes."' 145 The
decision is relevant to faith-based social service organizations receiving
government assistance for two reasons. First, the decision indicates the
Court may be more tolerant of government aid outside the elementary
school context. Second, the decision clarifies the "pervasively sectarian"
concept. According to the Court, factors indicating aid recipients are not
"pervasively sectarian" include autonomy from church control, 146 absence of religious indoctrination, 147 academic freedom, 148 absence of religious preference in hiring faculty, 1 4 9 and absence of religious
preference in admitting students. 150
The Court addressed the issue of government assistance to FBOs
under the separation theory in Bowen v. Kendrick.15 1 The Court upheld
the constitutionality of the Federal Adolescent Family Life Act.' 5 2 The
Act provides grants to FBOs for services and research relating to premarital adolescent sexuality and pregnancy. 53 Applying the Lemon test, the
Court concluded the nonreligious purpose of addressing premarital teenage sexuality and pregnancy primarily motivated the Act 154 and its effect
was not advancing or inhibiting religion. 55 The Act did not violate the
primary effect test by recognizing the role religious organizations had in
141 Id. at 223.
142 Id. at 225.

143

Id. at

232.

144 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
145 Id. at 739.
146 Id. at 755.
147

Id.

148 Id. at 757.
149

Id.

150 Id. at 757-58.
151 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
152 Id. at 593.

153 Id. at 593-95.
154 Id. at 602.
155 Id. at 611-12.

286

CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 10:265

addressing teenage sexuality and pregnancy, 56 provided the program
successfully maintained a neutral course. 157 The services provided did
not include religious indoctrination or teaching. 58 Furthermore, allowing religious organizations to participate as eligible grantees does not
impermissibly promote religion unless a significant proportion of funds
flow to "pervasively sectarian" institutions.' 5 9 The program's neutral
grant requirements and wide spectrum of organizations eligible to par160
ticipate undercut any risk of promoting religion.
The present (or any expansion) of the carefully crafted Charitable
Choice governmental funding mechanism would likely survive challenge
under the separation theory. Consonant with separationist theory, although a FBO is permitted to show religious symbols, such as art, icons,
or scripture, direct funds cannot pay for inherently religious activities,
such as sectarian worship, instruction, or proselytization. Justice
O'Connor, in her concurring opinion in Bowen, noted, "any use of public
funds to promote religious doctrines violates the Establishment
Clause." 161 Thus, FBO staff can talk about spiritual matters when recipients desire it, provided the discussion is not held during the time set for a
publicly funded social service program.
In addition, the recipients of the funding provided by Charitable
Choice are not defined by religion. Sacred and secular social service
providers are eligible to receive funding. More importantly, a faithbased provider cannot discriminate against any beneficiary on the basis
of religion, religious belief, or a refusal to actively participate in a religious practice. 162 As a FBO's services cannot be provided using a religious litmus test, ultimate funding recipients are not defined by religion.
Aid is offered to clients without regard to religion. Furthermore, because
beneficiaries cannot be forced to participate in religious activities, Charitable Choice funding will not lead to the coercion of anyone to support or
participate in religion or its exercise. Also, the direct funding does not
indicate government support and approval for religion in general, or a
particular religion. There is no appearance of endorsement of religion.
Nevertheless, loosening restrictions embedded in Charitable Choice, for
instance by removing the secular provider alternative, would magnify the
vulnerability of government funding of FBOs under separation
jurisprudence.
156 Id. at 605, 606-07.

157 Id. at 606, 609-12.
158 Id. at 612.
159
160
161
162

Id. at 610.

Id.
Id. at 623.

Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 104193, § 104, 110 Stat. 2105, 2163 (1996).
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EMERGING EQUAL TREATMENT VIEW

The competing equal treatment view has emerged in several U.S.
Supreme Court cases. 163 Under this view, the Establishment Clause has
the narrower purpose of forbidding the government from establishing a
national church or preferring one religion to another. This view rejects
the separation theory's assertion of the Establishment Clause preventing
the government from assisting religion generally. The equal treatment
view allows public sector aid to flow as part of a neutral scheme directly
to institutions, even those providing religious indoctrination and teaching. The equal treatment view therefore avoids the restrictions imposed
by the separationist doctrine on the use of public funds by FBOs.
The equal treatment theory is based, in part, on a revised historical
understanding of the Establishment Clause. In his dissenting opinion to
Wallace v. Jaffree,164 Chief Justice William Rehnquist explained the Es-

tablishment Clause's original intention was forbidding Congress from
designating any church as "a national church" and from enacting laws
preferring one religion to another. 165 "As its history abundantly shows,
however, nothing in the Establishment Clause requires government to be
strictly neutral between religion and irreligion, nor does that Clause prohibit Congress or the States from pursuing legitimate secular ends
166
through nondiscriminatory sectarian means."
167
The first case applying equal treatment was Widmar v. Vincent.
The Court held a state university could not exclude a Bible study group
from university facilities otherwise made available to registered student
groups. 168 When a public institution creates a forum open to private
speakers, it cannot exclude religious groups without violating their First
Amendment rights of free speech and association. 169 Since the property
is provided under a religion-neutral equal access policy, the Court reasoned the benefit to the religious group is incidental and there is no appearance of the university endorsing the group's religious views. 170
Similarly, in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School
District,17 1 the Court struck down a policy denying access to religious
groups using public school premises outside school hours to show a film
163 See generally Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Lamb's Chapel v.

Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S.
263 (1981).
164 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).

165 Id. at 99 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
166 Id. at 113 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
167 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
168 Id. at 277.
169 Id.
170 Id. at 274-75.
171 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
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on parenting.' 72 The facility was otherwise made available for social,
civic, and recreational purposes. 73 But the school policy explicitly excluded religious use.174 The Court held the exclusion violated the church
group's First Amendment rights of speech and assembly and rejected the
school's Establishment Clause defense compelling it to deny access. 175
No Establishment Clause violation occurred because, as in Widmar, the
school created a limited forum and granted neutral access. 176 Hence,
there was no danger of the community perceiving the school as endorsing the religious group's views.177 The significance of Lamb's Chapel is
the Court's explicit reliance on equal access in its analysis as opposed to
relying on separationism or the rationale that the benefit to religion was
78
incidental.1
In Rosenberger v. University of Virginia,179 the Court held the Establishment Clause does not compel a state university to bar funding for
a religiously oriented student publication when such aid was available to
all bona fide studen groups.1 80 No violation of the Establishment Clause
occurs when a university grants access on a religion-neutral basis to a
wide spectrum of student groups, including groups using funds for sectarian activities. 18' The majority focused on the fact that the financial sup82
port was distributed on a religion-neutral basis.1
Apart from direct government assistance programs such as Charitable Choice, use of the income tax system further minimizes the potential
for a successful constitutional challenge. The Supreme Court has held
government program providing assistance to religious institutions more
likely satisfy the Establishment Clause where aid is provided indirectly
through third parties. For example, in Mueller v. Allen,183 the Court upheld a state income tax statute allowing a deduction on a neutral basis for
educational costs incurred by parents, even though virtually all of the
benefit went to parents with children in parochial schools.1 84 Thus en172 Id.
173 Id. at 386-87.
174 Id.

175 Id. at 394-95.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 395.
178 STEPHEN V. MONSMA, WHEN SACRED & SECULAR Mix: RELIGIOUS NONPROFIT ORGA-

NIZATIONS AND PUBLIC MONEY 43 (1996).
179 515 U.S. 819 (1995).

180 Id. at 839.
181 Id.
182 Id. ("We have held that the guarantee of neutrality is respected, not offended, when the
government, following neutral criteria and evenhanded policies, extends benefits to recipients
whose ideologies and viewpoints, including religious ones, are broad and diverse.").

183 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
184 Id. at 400-01.
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hanced tax incentives for charitable donations would withstand Constitutional scrutiny under either the separation or equal treatment theories.
IV.

ARE FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS EFFECTIVE?

"[W]hen church congregations assist needy individuals, they do
more than merely pass out checks to case numbers - they help their
neighbors, thereby strengthening the bonds of community."' 85 This sentiment epitomizes why FBOs are effective in addressing crime and other
social ills as well as improving living standards in troubled communities.
What's more, the public generally agrees. A New York Times poll found
68% of Americans believe that "voluntary groups like charities and
churches" are better able to fight poverty in the cities than government.18 6 Although public interest in FBOs draws inspiration from extensive media coverage of groups such as the "Front Porch Alliance" and
"Prison Fellowship Ministries," this sentiment is more than superficial.
Empirical research hints at an inverse relationship between "religion" and pervasive social ills such as rampant crime, substance abuse,
and youth delinquency. Even so, the "faith-factor" thesis remains a subject of debate - a debate hamstrung by poor understanding of how religion influences behavior. This "how" gap makes confirmation of the
faith-factor thesis impossible. To bridge the gap, and thus lend credence
to the faith-factor thesis, this section assesses how religion affects
behavior.
With the exception of the empirical analyses of the Prison Fellowship Ministries ("Prison Fellowship"), this section employs studies measuring religion's impact on behavior generally rather than examining
FBOs directly. This measure of the faith-factor serves as a proxy for
assessing the potential effectiveness of religion utilized by FBOs, remembering that Charitable Choice bars public funding of sectarian worship, instruction, or proselytization. 87 Thus, a FBO may, but need not
separate its spiritual and secular aspects. It seemingly can seek conversions using private funds.
In itself, a statistical relationship linking religion and socially undesirable behavior is not dispositive. The observed correlation must be the
product of religion (the independent variable) acting upon behavior (the
dependent variable), and not the product of other independent or mediating factors. Thus, knowing the direction of "causation" is critical to either illuminating or debunking the faith-factor thesis.
185 Stephen Goldsmith, The City and Civil Society, THE Civ. Soc'Y PROJECT, June, 1997,
at 1, 8 (emphasis added).
186 N.Y. TIMES Poll, available at WESTLAW, POLL database, USNYT.DECI4 R16
(Dec. 14, 1990).
187 42 U.S.C. § 604a(j).
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The causation question asks whether religion is a predictor of socially beneficial behavior or only tangentially linked to it. Aside from
discerning the direction of causation, two reasons exist for knowing the
faith-factor's relative significance. First, without a mechanism explaining how much religion stops substance abuse or crime, the faith-factor
thesis remains vulnerable to competing theories that account for a substantial part of the relationship with other proximate mediating factors,
such as parental or nonreligious institutional factors. Second, policymakers need to know how to use religion in order to foster effective
programs nationwide. At present, legislators, like the public, have only a
vague notion that faith-based programs succeed where government has
failed.
The theory developed in this section attempts to define a faith-factor
mechanism reconciling inconsistent empirical findings and answering
three questions: (1) is religion a deterrent against pervasive social
problems; (2) are FBOs particularly effective in the most troubled communities; and (3) why is religion apparently more effective at rehabilitation than preventing deviant behavior.
A.

TOWARD A "FAITH-FACTOR"

THEORY

Developing a theory reconciling data from many sources is difficult
188
because of methodological differences found in empirical studies.
Two examples are differences in research quality (e.g., controls for race
and gender) and the number of factors used to measure religiosity. However, mathematical precision is not at issue. The faith factor theory
posits that structural identity, provided by a FBO, serves as a vital mechanism for social control. Rather than attempting to prove anything beyond a reasonable doubt, the proposed theory offers a degree of clarity
by showing that religion has a predictable effect on some, but not all,
forms of deviant behavior.
In this framework, FBOs serve two principal functions: "deterrence" and "rehabilitation." Deterrence is religion's positive role in
shaping and enforcing normative behavior to prevent deviancy. Four
mechanisms, or "protective factors," explain how: (1) religion helps
strengthen family solidarity; (2) religious organizations provide viable
parental support systems (e.g., parenting classes and pastoral family
counseling); (3) religious doctrines set boundaries; and (4) religious organizations provide young people with a coping resource outside the
family. 189
188 Byron R. Johnson et al., A Systematic Review of the Religiosity and Delinquency Literature: A Research Note, 16 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 32, 46 (2000).
189 Kenneth I. Maton & Elizabeth A. Wells, Religion as a Community Resource for WellBeing: Prevention, Healing, and Empowerment Pathways, 51 J. Soc. ISSUES 177, 179 (1995).
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Rehabilitation strives to "reform" convicts by preventing recidivism. Prison ministries use activities such as Bible study and seminars to
achieve this goal. These activities moderate behavior while incarcerated
and after release by helping inmates cope with the psychological trauma
of prison life.1 90
Faith-factor thesis critics argue that religion serves as a significant
predictor for only a few types of deviancy and other factors are far better
predictors for most others. 19 1 According to this view, religion is an insignificant predictor for most forms of deviancy when nonreligious factors are accounted for. 192 In other words, family and friends are better
placed than religion to create an environment non-conducive to deviant
behavior.
Faith-factor thesis proponents reject the assertion that religion is a
limited predictor of delinquency. 19 3 They criticize studies supporting
such a conclusion since they contain "soft variables" (e.g. self-reported
data rather than data derived from observable behavior), are of poor quality (e.g. lack of clarity, weak controls), or fail to address the "cumulative" effect of religion on the probability that a religious person will
engage in any deviant behavior.1 94 However, these analyses recognize,
at least empirically, certain types of deviant behavior not being consist195
ently affected by religion.
Interestingly, both views focus on methodology to substantiate
claims that the faith-factor is either mostly significant or mostly spurious.
Nevertheless, assuming their respective arguments are correct, and the
effects of religion have been grossly overstated or understated, why not
claim that religion is a predictor of every form of deviancy or none at all
instead of most or only few? It is because the data do not support an allor-nothing conclusion. Indeed, since the data do not lend themselves to
an all-or-nothing conclusion, perhaps these conflicting results are not the
product of inexact measurement, but are in fact a reflection of reality.
This suggests religion and deviancy are not monolithic concepts and the
actual causal mechanism governing the faith-factor is flexible.
190 Byron R. Johnson et al., Religious Programs,InstitutionalAdjustment, and Recidivism
Among FormerInmates in Prison Fellowship Programs, 14 JUST. Q. 145, 155 (1997); Michael
Wrigley & Mark LaGory, The Role of Religion and Spirituality in Rehabilitation:A Sociological Perspective, 1 J. RELIGION IN DISABILITY & REHABILITATION 27, 37-38 (1994).
191 John K. Cochran et al., Is the Religiosity-DelinquencyRelationship Spurious?:A Test
of Arousal and Social Control Theories, 31 J. RES. IN CRIME & DELINQ. 92, 103-10 (1994).
192

Id.

See John Gartner et al., Religious Commitment and Mental Health: A Review of the
EmpiricalLiterature, 19 J. PSYCH. & THEOLOGY 6, 15 (1991); Johnson et al., supra note 188,
at 45-46; Douglas M. Sloane & Raymond H. Potvin, Religion and Delinquency: Cutting
Through the Maze, 65 Soc. FORCES 87, 103-04 (1986).
194 See generally Gartner et al., Religious Commitment and Mental Health, at 6-15.
195 See generally id.
193
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Flexibility is incorporated into the proposed faith-factor theory by
segregating religion into two separate, though not mutually exclusive,
"identities." The first identity is termed "structural" in that it relates to
the organizational aspects of religion rather than theology. The second
identity is termed "evangelical" and focuses on the spiritual and emotional impacts of religion (e.g., salvation and forgiveness). These identities are linked to the two functional categories - deterrence and
rehabilitation - in different proportions. Whereas the evangelical identity is a more important part of rehabilitation, both identities are a necessary part of deterrence when the secular community offers little positive
reinforcement.
Recognizing that FBOs require both identities, to varying degrees,
to accomplish deterrence and rehabilitation offers greater accuracy than
what is found in conventional analyses. Indeed, the proposed faith-factor
theory predicts the inconsistencies found in the empirical record. It
predicts convict rehabilitation is easier than deterring deviant behavior in
a community devoid of secular controls because convicts live in a structured environment. This occurs because prison ministries can focus attention on their evangelical identity whereas faith-based programs aimed
at deterrence must provide both structural and evangelical identities in
the most troubled communities. The success of Prison Fellowship at reducing recidivism, in contrast to the highly fragmented and inconsistent
results associated with deterrence, supports this conclusion.
In short, the significance of faith-based solutions depends on the
environment they operate in and the number of functions undertaken.
Because the most troubled communities lack the capacity to promote
normative behavior, religion's evangelical identity will likewise not be
significant unless FBOs go to extraordinary lengths to Compensate for
the lack of secular structure. By contrast, in a structured environment
like a prison, the faith-factor will have greater significance because it
need only focus on its evangelical identity to function properly.
B.

DETERRENCE THROUGH FAITH?

FBOs are varied in their use of religion, when religion is defined as
"encompassing the spectrum of groups and activities whose focus extends beyond the material reality of everyday life (i.e., to a spiritual reality)." 19 6 They do not provide services according to one model. Instead,
FBOs field programs that have a religious orientation but that also meet
the temporal needs of the community: conflict mediation, drug treatment,
and after-school activities.
196 Maton & Wells, Religion as a Community Resource for Well-Being, supra note 189, at
178; see also Mark E. Barrett et al., Behavioral Changes of Adolescents in Drug Abuse Intervention Programs, 44 J. CLINICAL PSYCH. 462 (1988).
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Faith-factor studies reflect this diversity. No single research model
dominates studies of religion's effect on behavior. In empirical studies,
deviancy includes anything from teen pregnancy, truancy, suicide,
crimes against people, theft, and substance abuse. The following analysis focuses on three forms of deviancy that are often found in the empirical literature: substance abuse, juvenile delinquency, and crime.
Data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health
(NLSAH) (N = 12,118) showed that children with "religious identities" 197 were less likely to abuse cigarettes, alcohol or marijuana. 9 8
However, no similar link existed between religious identity and violent
behavior. 19 9 Furthermore, in relation to substance abuse, two competing
variables - "parent-adolescent connectedness" and "school connectedness" - more effectively inhibited cigarette, alcohol, and marijuana use
than religious identity. 200 Other large data sets echo the conflicting results found in the NLSAH study.
A Search Institute study (N = 34,129) measured religiosity using
three criteria: (1) time spent attending "services, groups or programs at a
church or synagogue" per week, 20 1 (2) frequency in attending "religious
services at a church or synagogue," 20 2 and (3) the self-reported importance of religion.20 3 Once again, religion inhibited cigarette, alcohol and
marijuana use among children. 2°4 Moreover, based on the study's definition of juvenile delinquency, religiosity also had an inhibitory effect on
that form of deviancy. 20 5 Yet religion's statistical significance as an explanatory factor for substance abuse and juvenile delinquency was no
stronger than three background variables: educational ability, educational
aspiration, and gender. However, the authors conclude that religion "is
as strong (or as weak) as any of the background variables that are more
frequently cited as determinants of attitudes and behavior ....

[Religion]

deserves attention as an important explanatory variable in these
areas."

20 6

197 Michael D. Resnick et al., Protecting Adolescents From Harm: Findings From the
National Longitudinal Study on Adolescent Health, 278 JAMA 823, 831 (1997) (defining "religious identities" as one who "pray[s] frequently, view[s] self as religious, affiliate[s] with a

religion").
198 Id.
199 Id.
200

id.

201 Michael J. Donahue & Peter L. Benson, Religion and the Well-Being of Adolescents,

51 J. Soc. ISSUES, 145, 154 (1995).
202 See generally id.
203 See generally id.
204 See generally id.
205 Id. (defining violence using 6 criteria: (1) being in trouble with the police, (2) fighting,

(3) vandalism, (4) gang fighting, (5) physically hurting someone, and (6) using a weapon to
extort something from a person).
206 Id. at 155.
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Criminal behavior (acts against people and property) is also a subject of controversy. For example, research drawn from the 1980 Religious Ecology Dataset (N = 15,217) compared church membership rates
with six classes of crime: murder, rape, assault, burglary, larceny, and
robbery. 20 7 Church membership had a significant inhibitory effect on
four classes, yet there was no correlation with murder and only an insignificant correlation with robbery. 20 8 This discrepancy may be explained
by the emerging consensus that religion is a more effective inhibitor of
substance abuse and delinquency (the so-called "anti-ascetic" behaviors),
though some current research, while not disproving this conclusion, does
not confirm it.209
The structural identity of religion is less important to a strong secular structured community. One might imagine a morally ambiguous
community having secular structure. The evangelical identity easily
takes root and mediates in this type of community through peer and family relationships. Yet more often, troubled communities lack secular
structure, thus the effectiveness of the evangelical message lessens unless
the community becomes extraordinarily religious in both its structural
and evangelical identities. African-American churches in the inner city
are an example of this. An analysis of the 1977 National Youth Survey
(N = 1,725) indicated that average involvement in serious crime among
"religious" youths, i.e., those who frequently attend church services, 210
living in "high disorder" communities, i.e., lacking social order (peace,
safety, observance of the law) and control (acts that maintain order), 21 1 is
in fact lower than the average in "low disorder" communities. 2 12 The
study suggests churches can compensate for the lack of secular structure
21 3
in the community through its own structural and evangelical identities.
In short, if few secular structures, such as strong families and
schools, exist in a community for transmitting normative beliefs, religion's evangelical message will less likely have a significant impact on
deviancy unless FBOs build those institutions from scratch.

207 William Sims Bainbridge, The Religious Ecology of Deviance, 54 AM. Soc. REv. 288,
290 (1989).
208 Id. at 292.
209 Brent B. Benda, The Effect of Religion on Adolescent Delinquency Revisited, 32 J.
RES. IN CRIME & DELINQ. 446 (1995); see also Bruce A. Chadwick & Brent L. Top, Religiosity and Delinquency Among LDS Adolescents, 32 J. FOR THE SCI. STUDY OF RELIGION 51

(1993).
210 Byron R. Johnson et al., The 'Invisible Institution' and Black Youth Crime: The
Church as an Agency of Local Social Control, 29 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 482, 485 (2000).
211 Id. at 481.
212 Id. at 486-87.
213 Id. at 492-93.
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REHABILITATION AND RENEWAL

The empirical record for recidivism and survival, survival being the
period of time until recidivism occurs, for those in Prison Fellowship, is
less ambiguous. Moreover, prison studies directly assess, thus, measure
the value of religion as utilized by FBOs. There are, however, far fewer
studies focusing on the effects of religion in a prison environment. Conclusive confirmation of its success awaits further research.
The Prison Fellowship strives to help inmates cope with the stress
of incarceration and prepare for release through religious instruction. It
organizes seminars, Bible studies, distributes newspapers, and facilitates
correspondence between prisoners and volunteers. Moreover, its "Innerchange Freedom Initiative," a prerelease program, helps inmates transition to the outside world by ministering to them before and after
release.
A study of New York State inmates (N = 402) found recidivism and
survival rates were far better among highly active members, although
participation in fellowship programs had no appreciable affect on behavior while in prison. 2 14 Without controlling for level of participation,
however, there was no difference between participants and non215
participants.
The perceived failure to affect behavior while incarcerated may be
due to uncertainties over causation. The data used in the New York
study did not specify whether problem behavior occurred before or after
participation in Prison Fellowship. Thus, problem behavior brought on
by mental and psychological distress may have led inmates to seek religious counseling. The study suggests religion is not a quick cure but a
more long-term, therapeutic remedy since limited involvement in Prison
Fellowship was not related to low recidivism whereas active involvement
was.

2 16

Although the New York and another inmate study (N = 365)217 concluded recidivism and survival rates were better among active participants to Prison Fellowship, 2 18 other variables must be controlled for.
Inmates considered high risk, based on the number of infractions while in
prison and other salient factors, had an impact on recidivism. Among
those participating in Prison Fellowship versus the control group, high2 19
risk inmates had higher recidivism rates and shorter survival times.
214 Johnson et al., supra note 190, at 154-63.
215 Id. at

161.

216 Mark C. Young et al., Long-Term Recidivism Among Federal Inmates Trained As
Volunteer Prison Ministers, 22 J. OFFENDER REHABILITATION 97, 111-13 (1995).
217 Id. at 106-15.

218 Id. at 108, 111.
219 Id.
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Although there is less empirical data, the Prison Fellowship seems
to helps lower recidivism among active participants deemed "low risk"
(e.g., not prone to repeat offenses). Religious instruction may not be an
effective course of therapy with hardened criminals. Nevertheless, the
finding of religion helping those on the fringe is consistent with some
theories behind rehabilitation. Those theories believe the act of incarceration is psychologically traumatizing. Hence, lessening the trauma suffered in prison reduces the risk of it spilling over into life after prison.
Another notion is religion being more effective when administered
in prisons than used as a deterrent in troubled communities. Removed
from the dysfunctional environment, which led to incarceration, and
given adequate structure, an inmate is free to focus on spiritual growth,
which not only mitigates the incarceration process, but also uses the time
to develop a moral foundation.
Prison Ministries' long-term effect on inmates, as shown by the
lower recidivism rates, demonstrates a slow process of moral growth
translating into an ability to live without crime. In essence, this view
rediscovers the value of the old penitentiary: a place giving wayward
people the chance at renewal.
Thus the structure imposed in prisons allows inmates to focus on
religion's spiritual identity. As opposed to the problems experienced by
communities without secular structure, prisons have an abundance of
structure. Religious instruction need not dwell on providing what the
secular authorities have failed to. In the worst communities religious
groups must do both. Unfortunately, they are successful only if they go
to tremendous lengths to make up for the lack of secular structure.
D.

WHAT CAN

FBOs

HOPE TO ACCOMPLISH?

Based on the empirical evidence and analyses presented, the three
questions posed in this section's introduction can be answered.
First, does religion deter problems like crime, substance abuse, and
juvenile delinquency and if so, can FBOs inoculate communities by providing social services with a religious component? Despite the contradictory evidence, the proposed faith-factor theory spells out the
conditions under which religion can lessen deviant behavior and explains
their necessity. For religion to be a successful promoter of normative
behavior or deterrent of deviant behavior, there must be structure. This
structure can be secular or religious - the so-called structural identity
- but in either case it is a vital mechanism for social control. If such a
structure exists, then it is possible for religion to have a positive role in
preventing deviant behavior.
Second, if FBOs are capable of renewing communities, are they always effective? Effectiveness depends on two factors according to the
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faith-factor theory: a structured environment and competent organizations. The latter condition, a basic assumption in this analysis, is crucial.
It is too easy to overlook the fact that a FBO must balance the temporal
needs of its beneficiaries with remaining faithful to its spiritual and
moral mission. Although in theory, the faith-factor is perfectly suited for
morally ambiguous communities that have secular structure, FBOs are
most needed in inner city communities lacking any structure. To be effective, FBOs first need to set up their own structures and use them to
promote their spiritual and moral message. In both cases, the organization must be competently run to be effective.
And third, why is religion seemingly more effective at rehabilitation
than at preventing deviancy? The proper prison environment is a far
better vehicle for instilling normative values in low risk prisoners. Indeed, a prison is preferable to the highly dysfunctional inner city because
incarceration provides structure. With the secular component providing
structure, FBOs concentrate on the evangelical mission of building moral
character, and thus under the right conditions prisons are effective vehicles for promoting normative behavior.
FBOs are faced with an intractable problem in inner city communities: the lack of secular structure. Without it, FBOs must create their
own structure at enormous cost. In short, most FBOs currently lack the
financial and human resources to build structures for transmitting normative values. Thus, FBOs are not as effective as theoretically possible.
Hopefully, new federal initiatives will help FBOs gain the necessary financial resources, thereby enabling religious groups to develop stronger
structures. Communities may also, on their own initiative, develop secular structures after FBOs are more involved in meeting social ills.
V.

PRESIDENT BUSH'S PLAN AND ALTERNATIVES

During the 2000 presidential campaign, former Vice President Gore
and President Bush both endorsed a greater role for FBOs in the delivery
of social services. However, the candidates took different approaches on
the critical issue of providing additional financing, with Mr. Gore relying
on direct government aid and President Bush favoring increased tax incentives for private giving.
A.

BROADER ACCESS TO FEDERAL FUNDING

The Gore campaign advocated more public funding for FBOs
through an expanded Charitable Choice program. 220 Gore proposed ex220 Al Gore, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by Vice-President Al Gore on the Role of
Faith-Based Organizations (May 24, 1999), available at www.algore2000.com/speeches/
speeches-faith_052499.html; Kevin Sack, Gore Backs Federal Money for Church Social Service Programs, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1999, at A23.
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panding Charitable Choice to encompass federally funded social services
for homelessness, youth violence, and substance abuse treatment. 22 1
Gore's approach carried forward current limitations in the law, including
mandating a secular alternative, barring any use of government funds for
proselytizing, and requiring FBOs to account for the use of federal
funds. 222 In addition to expanding Charitable Choice, Gore also proposed a program to increase charitable contributions by encouraging private employers to match employee contributions to FBOs. 223
One advantage of using direct government assistance centers is the
ability to ensure recipient organizations meeting basic administrative, financial, and managerial standards. Although Charitable Choice prohibits
the public sector from discriminating against a FBO due to its religious
character, the government may utilize its usual criteria to decide whether
a particular organization will receive contracts. Moreover, unlike a program of voluntary contributions, the government can target financial assistance to FBOs serving the most troubled communities. However,
smaller, low budget charities may have difficulty satisfying federal contracting requirements.
Once grants are awarded, compliance with ongoing monitoring and
accounting requirements may have unintended consequences. For example, FBOs accepting federal funding may need to comply with government regulations requiring them to deliver services in an unaccustomed
manner, maintain different staffing levels, or employ only staff with
specified credentials. 224 This degree of government control can result in
the unwanted consequence of diverting resources to regulatory compliance and eroding a charity's spiritual, moral, and care-giving mission.
The financial audit, although limited in scope, may also be quite
intrusive.
Watering down the religious contents of FBOs will likely diminish
their effectiveness. 225 FBOs succeed in turning lives around because
they instill religious conviction by helping individuals find meaning and
hope in their lives. By accepting government funding, the entity inevitably becomes more "secularized," and may, like Charitable Choice, be
barred from using funds for sectarian worship, instruction, or
proselytization.
221 Gore, supra note 220.
222 Id.
223 Id.

224 Joe Loconte, The 7 Deadly Sins of Government Fundingfor Private Charities, POL'Y
REV., Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 28.
225 Isaac Kramnick & R. Laurence Moore, Can the Churches Save the Cities?: FaithBased Services and the Constitution, THE AM. PROSPECT, Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 50; Sherman,
supra note 16, at 60, 62.
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Another potential drawback centers on the risk of increased financial dependency on government funding. FBOs may lose focus on their
spiritual and moral mission because of the necessity of lobbying and currying favor with federal agencies. 22 6 As with other government contractors, the corrupting influence of public sector funding makes FBOs
vulnerable to being "captured" by the grant-making process.
B.

TAX INCENTIVES TO SPUR PRIVATE GIVING TO

FBOs

President Bush favors using tax incenties to encourage increased
charitable contributions. 22 7 During his campaign, President Bush proposed creating a special charitable contribution deduction, in addition to
the standard deduction, for the 80 million taxpayers (70% of all filers)
228
who do not elect to claim itemized deductions under the Tax Code.
He also proposed increasing the cap on corporate charitable contributions
from 10% to 15% of taxable income and allowing retirement-age individuals to make tax-free withdrawals from individual retirement accounts
for charitable contributions. 229 Bush would also create a charitable statetax credit allowing individuals and corporations to claim a credit against
state income or other taxes for contributions to charities. 2 30 States, in
turn, could recoup the revenue cost by receiving additional federal wel23
fare transfer payments. '
Proponents argue that use of deductions and credits allows individuals and corporations, rather than federal and state bureaucrats, to select
and evaluate FBOs. This approach makes charitable organizations directly accountable to their contributors instead of government officials
and agencies. In other words, funding is free from much of the burdensome regulation otherwise accompanying direct government assistance.
The federal government need only certify the charitable status of FBOs
to enable contributions to qualify for a charitable deduction under the
Tax Code. The lessened role of the government and attendant administrative costs result in a greater percentage of each dollar contributed being put to work by charities.
226 Michael Horowitz, Subsidies May Cost Churches Their Souls, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16,

1999, at A22.
227 George W. Bush, The Duty of Hope, Address at the Metro Church, Indianapolis (July
22, 1999), available at http://www.georgewbush.com/speeches/faith/dutyofhope.htm [herein-

after Bush, Duty of Hope]; Adam Clymer, Filter Aid to Poor Through Churches, Bush Urges,
N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1999, at AI; George W. Bush, Faith-Based Initiatives: Encouraging and
Outpouring of Giving, Aug. 2, 1999, at http://www.georgewbush.comissues/domestic/faith/
giving.asp [hereinafter Bush, Encouraging and Outpouring of Giving].
228 Bush, Duty of Hope, supra note 227.
229 Bush, Encouraging and Outpouring of Giving, supra note 227.
230
231

Id.
Id.
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Although we favor the use of the less bureaucratic Tax Code approach as a means of funding FBOS without fostering a loss of mission,
several drawbacks exist. First, restoring the charitable deduction for
non-itemizers, which existed prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, while
encouraging lower and middle-income taxpayers to begin charitable giving, adds complexity to individual returns. Taxpayers who do not otherwise itemize their deductions would need to maintain records of their
charitable contributions. The proposed charitable contribution deduction
for non-itemizers would be subject to the present percentage of income
33
limitations2 32 and could not exceed the standard deduction dollar cap.2
Record keeping and limits on the availability of tax benefits serve, how234
ever, as key sources of complexity for individuals in the tax system.
Second, restoring the charitable contribution for non-itemizers creates a double deduction problem. This standard deduction already compensates for the inability of non-itemizers to deduct charitable
contributions. Congress could avoid this problem by allowing a deduction only in excess of a specified floor amount. However, this type of
provision could further compound the complexity problem.
Third, using tax deductions rather than credits is subject to criticism
on equity grounds. A tax deduction reduces tax liability indirectly by
reducing the amount of the income subject to taxation. A tax credit results in a dollar-for-dollar reduction in tax liability equal to the amount of
the credit. Compared to tax deductions, the credit approach provides taxpayers a more economically valuable incentive because it reduces taxes
directly and accords a greater tax benefit for lower income taxpayers. To
deal with this objection, President Bush coupled the tax deduction initiative with his charitable state-tax credit proposal.
Fourth, expanded use of the income tax system may not channel
financial assistance to inner city charities where it is most needed. Under
President Bush's proposal, individuals and corporations, not the government, would decide who receives contributions. The increased tax subsidies may benefit other non-profit institutions, such as suburban hospitals
and educational institutions. 235 To deal with this problem, the charitable
state-tax credit proposal would allow states to pick the charities they
want to target with the credit.
Finally, will the tax breaks encourage an increase in charitable giving by individuals and corporations? Proponents assume so. A recent
232 I.R.C. § 170(b) (1995).
233 I.R.C. § 63(b)(2) (1995).
234 Overview of PresentLaw and Issues Relating to Individual Income Taxes: Scheduled
for a Public Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance on Apr. 15, 1999, JCX-18-99, 106th
Cong. (1999) (prepared by the Staff of the Joint Comm. on Taxation).
235 Kuo, supra note 18, at 34.
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study conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers concluded that President
Bush's proposal would stimulate an additional $14.6 billion in charitable
giving in 2000 - an increase of 11.9% - and would generate a 16.6%
rise in the number of givers. 236 In 1986, when non-itemizers could deduct 100% of their contributions, donations by non-itemizers rose 40%
from 1985, when they could only deduct 50%.237 However, even if tax
incentives do not lead to an outpouring of new funds for FBOs, policymakers may reexamine direct funding alternatives.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Welfare Reform Act of 1996 represents only the first stage in a
complete overhaul of the nation's federal public assistance programs. Indeed, to justify the economic realities imposed by welfare reform and
refute the criticism that reform is only concerned with saving money, the
federal government should embrace a new social policy fully utilizing
FBOs.
Serious, but manageable, financial and constitutional limitations exist on any relationship between the government and FBOs. A tax-oriented funding policy, while not perfect, is preferable to direct
government funding because it does not generate a new bureaucracy.
This will comfort FBOs because being "captured" by the government is
their principal reservation to accepting public money. Tax-oriented
funding is also more consistent with the Supreme Court's rulings on
church/state interactions and thus more likely to withstand constitutional
scrutiny.
Absent the funding and constitutional limitations, two further questions remain. First, are FBOs willing to increase their responsibilities
and do more to meet America's social ills? Many smaller FBOs believe
a shoestring budget is part of their key to success, and so they may not
want more money. Other FBOs rely so heavily on a few people that they
do not see how they can grow bigger or deal with more personnel. While
striving to preserve the distinct character of smaller organizations,
namely their accessibility and ability to deal with people on an individual
basis, FBOs are now presented with an unparalleled opportunity to do
even more. Assuming FBOs take on greater responsibilities, a second
question assumes paramount importance: How will FBOs staff their expanded programs? Using qualified seniors as volunteers may help allevi236 NAT'L ECONOMIC

CONSULTING,

PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS

LLP, INCENTIVES

NONITEM17RS TO GIVE MORE: AN ANALYSIS PREPARED FOR INDEPENDENT

SECTOR

FOR

(2001),

available at http://www.independentsector.org.
237 Fred Stokeld, Bush Plan Would Give Charitable Deduction to Non-Itemizers, TAX
NOTES TODAY,

Dec. 1, 1999.

302

CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 10:265

ate the short staffing dilemma while encouraging a positive contribution
by older persons.
There is no way to be empirically certain that religious social service providers are more effective at dealing with chronic social problems
than traditional government programs. The inconsistencies in the empirical record confirm this observation. However, the analytical framework
developed offers some clarity. Religion can be an effective tool of social
policy when coupled with traditional, secular social programs. As such,
it is foolish not to use FBOs to meet America's social ills. Instilling a
stronger sense of personal responsibility and of empowering more Americans to take control of their lives is worthy of different approaches. A
competitive, parallel structure where consumers choose their own service
providers will challenge traditional public sector schemes, forcing a rethinking of their mission and values.

